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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
In Winter v. Pratt' the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to give a narrow reading to the state's general prohibition
of the sale of liquor and held that a sale is a sale by any other
name. The defendant was the operator of a motel cocktail lounge.
Although "brown-bagging" was allowed, the lounge purported to
offer free liquor to any patron who had neglected to bring his own
supply. The patron was merely required to purchase a "set up"
consisting of a glass, mixer, and ice. The price of the set up was
the same to brown-baggers and free-loaders alike. A sign on the
lounge wall characterized the free liquor as gifts made "in appre-
ciation for your patronage." 2
The defendant was charged with violating the provisions of
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act forbidding all sales of liquor
except those made in accordance with the Act.3 At the time only
licensed wholesale and retail dealers could sell hard liquor. Al-
though the defendant was not such a dealer, he argued that there
had been no "sale" within the meaning of the statute and
supported that contention by citing Colonial Stores, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Commission.' The Colonial Stores case involved the
question of whether the distribution of trading stamps by a gro-
cery store was a sale. Dicta in the case indicated that the court
regarded the question of consideration as crucial in finding a sale
under certain circumstances. The defendant then cited a Georgia
case, Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Undercofler,5 in which the court
expressly reached the question of consideration. The Georgia
court decided that trading stamps were a cost of doing business,
distributed in anticipation of good will and return business only,
and that no recognizable consideration was received in return.
The defendant in Winter pointed out that the South Carolina
court, in its Colonial Stores case, had commented favorably on
the analysis of the Georgia court in the prior Colonial Stores case.,
1. 258 S.C. 397, 189 S.E.2d 7, appeal dismissed mem., 93 S. Ct. 430 (1972) (no federal
question). See also Survey of Administrative Law supra; Survey of S.C. Constitutional
Law infra.
2. Id. at 402, 189 S.E.2d at 8.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-91 (1962).
4. 253 S.C. 14, 168 S.E.2d 774 (1969).
5. 223 Ga. 105, 153 S.E.2d 549 (1967).
6. Brief for Appellant at 5, Winter v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 397, 189 S.E.2d 7 (1972).
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This comment, it was contended, indicated an acceptance by the
South Carolina court of the Georgia court's analysis of the sales
question. The Georgia court found that the issuance of trading
stamps was simply a method of promoting good will and return
business, and that no sale had occurred. The defendant in Winter
claimed the same motivation and argued that his case was thus
"on all fours" with the Georgia Colonial Stores case.7
In response the State maintained that whether a sale had
transpired involved a purely factual determination that could be
reversed only if the finding of fact was "wholly unsupported by
the evidence." 8 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission,
which made the finding, considered the defendant's gifts to be a
mere scheme designed to disguise an actual sale. Citing two ven-
erable Maryland cases, Franklin v. State9 and Archer v. State,'"
the State sought to demonstrate that the defendant's originality
was no greater than his generosity. In both cases the Maryland
court found the purported gifts of liquor to be thinly disguised
sales.
Attacking the defendant's analysis of consideration, the
State also cited several cases holding that any benefit may consti-
tute considerationm., The good will and return business of custom-
ers, it was argued, were sufficient benefit to satisfy this require-
ment.
The supreme court, without mentioning either of the
Colonial Stores cases, held that the money that passed as pay-
ment for the set ups was consideration for the liquor. The court
also quoted two legal encyclopedias stating that a court will look
behind any artifice employed to disguise an evasion of the liquor
laws. 2
The defendant in State v. Muldrow"3 was convicted of mur-
der and armed robbery. He contended that he should have been
sentenced as though he had committed only one offense, relying
on section 17-553.2 of the South Carolina Code:
7. Id. at 7.
8. Brief for Respondent at 1.
9. 12 Md. 236 (1858).
10. 45 Md. 33 (1876).
11. Brief for Respondent at 7.
12. 258 S.C. at 403-04, 189 S.E.2d at 9; see 45 A. JuR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 239
(1969); 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 244 (1955).
13. 259 S.C. 415, 192 S.E.2d 211 (1972).
19731
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In determining the number of offenses for the purpose of imposi-
tion of sentence, the court shall treat as one offense any number
of offenses which have been committed at times so closely con-
nected in point of time that they may be considered as one
offense, notwithstanding under the law they constitute separate
and distinct offenses.
4
The court held, however, that this section was to be applied only
in conjunction with section 17-553.1, which prescribes mandatory
sentences for persons convicted of the third or fourth identical
offense, and thus did not apply to the defendant."
In two cases the supreme court restated some basic common
law doctrines. In State v. Collington" the court was confronted
with an infanticide case. As in many such cases a crucial question
was whether the infant had been born alive. Before testing the
sufficiency of the evidence on that point, the court reaffirmed the
principle that the two basic elements of the corpus delicti for
homicide-death of a human being caused by the criminal act of
another-are insufficient to establish the corpus delicti in cases
of infanticide. Proof that the infant was born alive is also neces-
sary. 7
In State v. Crowe' the court restated the felony-murder rule:
[If two or more combined to commit an unlawful act. . . and,
in the execution of that criminal act, a homicide is committed
by one of the actors, as a probable or natural consequence of the
acts done in pursuance of the common design, all present partic-
ipating in the unlawful undertaking are as guilty as the one who
committed the fatal act."
The court thus upheld the murder conviction of one of the defen-
dants because the murder had been committed during an armed
robbery.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Both defendants in State v. Crowell challenged the admis-
14. S.C. ConE ANN. § 17-553.2 (1962).
15. Id. § 17-553.1.
16. 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d 856 (1972).
17. The medical testimony was held to be sufficient to establish this fact. Id. at 451,
192 S.E.2d at 858.
18. 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Dec.
19, 1972).
19. Id. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 382.
20. 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972).
[Vol. 25
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sion of the murder weapon as evidence on the grounds that it had
been illegally seized. One of the defendants had gone home after
allegedly committing a murder, and several hours later the police,
having secured an arrest warrant, went there to arrest him. He
was found in his bedroom and arrested. One pistol was on a chair
by the bed, another was plainly visible under the bed, and some
ammunition was on a nearby dresser. These articles were seized
and introduced as evidence at the trial. The supreme court ruled
that Chimel v. California21 was controlling because the guns were
in plain view and within reach of the defendant, justifying the
police in seizing them for their own protection.
One case in which the court disallowed evidence seized in the
course of a warrantless intrusion was State v. Vice.22 In that case
the police followed a trail of blood from the body of a murder
victim, who had been dead for several hours, to the door of the
defendant's boarding house room. The door was locked with a
padlock from the outside. At the request of the police, who had
no search or arrest warrant, the landlady unlocked the door and
let the policemen enter the defendant's room where certain evi-
dence was obtained.
The State, relying on Warden v. Hayden,23 contended that
the exigencies of the situation compelled an immediate search of
the room. In Warden a robber was trailed to a house and the
police arrived within five minutes. As the Supreme Court said in
Warden, "Speed here was essential. ' 24 The South Carolina court
concluded that speed was not essential in the Vice case because
the locked door clearly indicated that the murderer was not in the
room. The court also rejected the contention that the introduc-
tion of evidence obtained by the unlawful search (blood spots on
the floor whch were of the same type as the victim's blood) was
harmless error. The blood spots trailed from the victim's body
21. 395 U.S. 752 (1968). In Chimel a search incident to an arrest was held to have
exceeded constitutional limitations. Describing those limitations, the Court stated:
A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control' . Id. at 763.
22. 259 S.C. 30, 190 S.E.2d 510 (1972).
23. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
24. Id. at 299. A search or arrest warrant is of course unnecessary in a "hot pursuit"
situation such as that in Warden. The pursuit in Vice was not even lukewarm.
1973]
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into a room that only the defendant and his landlady could open.
Such evidence "could hardly be held to be harmless.
'2 5
In Taylor v. State"8 the court refused to reverse a conviction
because of the admission of illegally seized evidence. In contrast
to Vice, the questionable evidence in Taylor was not connected
to the defendant and in no way tended to incriminate him.
Rather, it bore on the guilt of a co-defendant who pleaded guilty
at the conclusion of the State's case. Thus the evidence, even if
wrongfully seized and admitted, was harmless.
2 1
Another case in which illegally seized evidence was held to
be harmless was State v. Shaw.2 1 The prosecutrix in that case
claimed to have been raped by the defendants in the automobile
of one of them and then abandoned on the road sans her pants.
The police later found a pair of women's pants in a car belonging
to one of the defendants, along with a wallet belonging to another
defendant. These items were seized without a warrant and placed
into evidence. The State relied on the "plain view" doctrine, but
the court ruled without reaching that point, holding that the only
facts established by the evidence were the presence of the prose-
cutrix in the car (in somewhat questionable circumstances) and
the presence of one of the defendants in the same automobile. At
trial all of the defendants admitted and testified to being in the
automobile and there having sexual relations with the prosecu-
trix. "Appellants therefore freely admitted everything that the
introduction of these items established, and no prejudice could
have resulted from their admission in evidence."2
In State v. Miller0 the court considered the admissibility of
evidence obtained during a search conducted without a warrant
but with the consent of a third party. The consenting party in this
25. 259 S.C. at 37, 190 S.E.2d at 512.
26. 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 (1972).
27. The fun and games made possible by the still-developing harmless error doctrine
may be illustrated by comparing the facts in Taylor with those of Whiteley v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560 (1971). In Whiteley the admission of illegally seized evidence was held not
to be harmless error because the only other evidence incriminating the defendant was the
testimony of an accomplice. In South Carolina such a result may not be required, because
this state has expressly rejected the theory that a conviction cannot stand solely on the
testimony of an accomplice. The case was a prior appeal by the same appellant as in
Taylor. Taylor v. State, 255 S.C. 147, 177 S.E.2d 550 (1970).
28. 258 S.C. 236, 188 S.E.2d 186 (1972).
29. Id. at 239, 188 S.E.2d at 187. The "plain view" doctrine was announced in Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), in which the seizure of an automobile registration
card, plainly visible in the automobile, was held to have been proper.
30. 193 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 1972).
[Vol. 25
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case was the defendant's mother, and the area searched was the
house in which she and the defendant lived. The record indicated
that the mother consented to the search with full knowledge of
her right to refuse. One piece of evidence was found in a box in
the kitchen, and other items were brought from the defendant's
room by the mother and given to the police'.3 The court ruled that
the defendant's right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures had not been violated. This holding would seem to
be consistent with Bumper v. North Carolina,3 2 which indicated
that a grandmother's consent to the search of a house that she
owned, if made voluntarily, would be effective against a grandson
who also lived there.
The facts in Miller also seem to justify admission of the
evidence under the Frazier-Katz approach. In Frazier v. Cupp
33
consent by the defendant's cousin to the search of a jointly-used
duffel bag was upheld on the theory that the defendant had as-
sumed the risk of such consent and that, because the cousin had
access to the bag, there was no "justified expectation of privacy"
that would bring the case within the rule of Katz v. United
States.34 Although a son may not assume the risk of a search of
his room by the police, it is not an unreasonable extension of
Frazier to find that he does assume the risk of his mother's con-
sent to such a search.3
5
III. PRELIMINARY HEARING
In State v. Funderburk6 the court dealt with the conse-
quences of a misapplication of section 43-232 of the South Caro-
lina Code, which in certain circumstances provides for a prelimi-
nary hearing on the question of probable cause .3 The defendant
31. Record at 126-36.
32. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
33. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. See United States v. Abbarno, 342 F. Supp. 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); State v. Pruitt,
479 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1972); State v. Mizelle, 15 N.C. App. 583, 190 S.E.2d 277 (1972);
State v. Evans, 372 P.2d 365 (Hawaii 1962). Contra, People v. Nunn, 7 Il1. App. 3d 601,
288 N.E.2d 88 (1972).
36. 259 S.C. 256, 191 S.E.2d 520 (1972).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-232 (1962) reads as follows:
Any magistrate who issues a warrant charging a crime beyond his jurisdiction
shall grant and hold a preliminary investigation of it upon the demand in writ-
1973]
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was arrested upon a magistrate's warrant and made a timely
written request for a preliminary hearing. The preliminary hear-
ing was not held for several months, by which time an indictment
had been handed down. The supreme court held that under the
terms of section 43-232 the trial court had no jurisdiction of the
case at the time of the indictment, and that this lack of jurisdic-
tion could be raised at any point in the proceedings.
Another case arising under the same section of the Code
raises some extremely interesting questions. In State v. Wheelei 3 8
the court held that the defendant waived his right to a prelimi-
nary hearing by failing to make his request in writing. One issue
in the case was whether a proceeding, which purported to be a
preliminary hearing, met the requirements of the statute apart
from the requirement of a written request. The parties argued this
point extensively, but the court's holding disposed of it briefly.
The chronology of the case is as follows:
The defendants were arrested on January 25, 1970. They
were then either advised of their right to counsel, which they
declined, or they were asked to sign an unexplained waiver, which
they refused to do.39 The defendants asked for a preliminary hear-
ing which was held on January 28, 1970. The presiding magistrate
took the question of probable cause under advisement, and an
indictment was returned in March, 1970. At about that time
counsel for defendants were appointed. The defendants then es-
caped from custody and were not tried until March, 1971. More
than ten days prior to the opening of the March, 1971 term of
court, the defendants' counsel made a written request for a pre-
liminary hearing, which was denied. They then moved to quash
the indictment, alleging that no determination of probable cause
had ever been made. At the hearing on this motion, the magis-
ing of the defendant made at least ten days before the convening of the next
court of general sessions, at which investigation the defendant may cross-
examine the State's witnesses in person or by counsel, have the reply in argu-
ment if there be counsel for the State, and be heard in argument in person or
by counsel as to whether a probable case has been made out and as to whether
the case ought to be dismissed by the magistrate and the defendant discharged
without delay. When such a hearing has been so demanded the case shall not
be transmitted to the court of general sessions or submitted to the grand jury
until the preliminary hearing shall have been had, the magistrate to retain
jurisdiction and the court of general sessions not to acquire jurisdiction until
after such preliminary hearing. [Emphasis added.]
38. 193 S.E.2d 515 (S.C. 1972).
39. Compare Brief for Appellant at 1 with Brief for Respondent at 1.
[Vol. 25
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trate entered a statement reciting that he had found probable
cause on the basis of the 1970 hearing fourteen months earlier."
This was the first time the defendants were informed of any such
determination. The motion to quash was denied, and the defen-
dants were tried and convicted of housebreaking and grand lar-
ceny.
On appeal the defendants argued that section 43-232 was
designed to safeguard the rights of the accused and should be
liberally read. Therefore, they contended that a ruling on proba-
ble cause should be made at the time of the hearing or shortly
thereafter. A portion of the statute was quoted that seemingly
requires a magistrate to determine "whether a probable case has
been made out . . .[or] whether the case ought to be dismissed
• ..and the [accused] discharged without delay. 42 Fourteen
months, it was argued, was exactly the delay that the statute was
designed to avoid. The State contended that the magistrate must
have determined probable cause because he forwarded the case
to the grand jury for an indictment. There is no requirement, said
the State, that a ruling be made in open court or entered into any
record, or even transmitted by the magistrate to the defendant,
as long as "the cold requirements of the statute are met."43 The
question was thus reduced to whether an open and speedy ruling
on probable cause is required by section 43-232, or whether the
statute is satisfied by cavalier compliance with its provisions.
Because the court did not rule on this point in Wheeler, the
question remains unanswered.
IV. INDICTMENT
In State v. Ham44 the court considered the constitutional
requirements pertaining to the contents of an indictment. The
United States Constitution demands that a defendant "be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation." 5 One of the
functions of an indictment is to convey this information. The test
of the sufficiency of an indictment, as applied in Ham, is whether
40. Record at 14.
41. Brief for Appellant at 2.
42. Id. at 1-2, quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-232 (1962) (emphasis added); set forth
in full at note 36 supra.
43. Brief for Respondent at 3.
44. 259 S.C. 118, 191 S.E.2d 13 (1972).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1973]
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the indictment contains all the necessary elements of the crime
charged, thereby giving the defendant proper notice of the accu-
sation. The court held that, in an indictment charging illegal
possession of a drug, librium, the exact time of day at which the
possession occurred need not be specified because it is not an
element of the crime.
V. CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. Voluntariness
In State v. Bellue46 the defendant was charged with murder,
to which he confessed during police interrogation. He claimed to
have been incapable of making a voluntary confession because
he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the confession.
The trial judge decided the evidence established that the confes-
sion was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.47 The supreme
court held that such a factual determination can not be over-
turned on appeal if there is any evidence to support it.
In Clark v. State8 the defendant argued that his plea of
guilty to manslaughter was involuntary. The State had in its
possession a confession of murder that the defendant alleged had
been illegally obtained. The defendant argued that he knew he
would be convicted by the confession, and that his plea of guilty
to the manslaughter charge was rendered involuntary by that
knowledge. The court held that the voluntariness of the guilty
plea had been decided by the trial court on the basis of a thorough
examination of the defendant. Because there was evidence sup-
porting this decision, the supreme court would not reverse. An
identical ruling had been made several months earlier in McCall
v. State.4"
In State v. Jordan"0 the question was the voluntariness of a
statement made in an allegedly wrongful custodial interrogation.
The defendant in that case denied that he was given the Miranda
46. 193 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1972).
47. The trial judge held a hearing on the question of voluntariness as required by
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The prosecution must prove at least by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477
(1972). For further discussion of this issue, see Survey of Evidence infra.
48. 259 S.C. 378, 192 S.E.2d 209 (1972).
49. 258 S.C. 469, 189 S.E.2d 6 (1972).
50. 258 S.C. 340, 188 S.E.2d 780 (1972).
[Vol. 25
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warnings before being questioned. The police, of course, claimed
to have given the warnings. The defendant, upon being ques-
tioned by the trial judge, admitted that he had freely made cer-
tain inculpatory statements during the interrogation. The trial
judge so ruled and admitted the statements into evidence. The
supreme court held that the defendant's testimony supported the
trial judge's ruling regardless of whether the Miranda warnings
were given.
B. Miranda Warnings
Two other cases involving the Miranda warnings were re-
solved by the court through reliance on factual determinations
made by the lower courts. In State v. Collington ' the defendant
came to a police station accompanied by her father. The police
testified that she was given the Miranda warnings, that she said
she had already retained a lawyer but did not want him present,
and that she wanted to confess to killing her baby. She then made
a written confession that was subsequently admitted into evi-
dence at the trial.2 The supreme court decided upon the basis of
this testimony that the trial court was justified in admitting the
confession.
In State v. Smith53 a thirteen-year-old boy was arrested for
murder and given the Miranda warnings in the presence of his
mother. Both the defendant and his mother waived his right to
an attorney and volunteered to take a lie detector test. The defen-
dant took the test and at its conclusion was told that the results
indicated that he had not told the truth. By this time thirty
minutes had passed since the Miranda warnings had been given.
They were not repeated, and the defendant in the presence of his
mother confessed to the crime charged. This confession was intro-
duced as evidence at the trial. The trial judge, however, refused
to allow it, stating that the Miranda warnings should have been
repeated as a matter of law. On appeal by the State, the supreme
court reversed the trial judge, holding that the question of
whether the Miranda warnings should have been repeated is one
of fact, not law. Thus the question should have been decided by
the trial judge only after an inquiry into the surrounding circum-
51. 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E.2d 856 (1972).
52. Brief for Appellant at 7-11.
53. 192 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1972).
1973]
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stances. This decision seems to be in line with numerous cases
involving different factual situations. 4
C. Self-Incrimination
On the morning of March 16, 1968, an unidentified male
called the Charleston Police Department and reported that a man
had been hurt on George Street. This call was automatically re-
corded. A body was discovered, and Lawrence Vice, Jr., the de-
fendant in State v. Vice,55 was charged with the murder. At his
trial Vice was required to speak into a tape recorder out of the
jury's presence so that his recorded voice could be compared by
the jury with the recording made of the phone call to the Police
Department. The supreme court on appeal held that requiring
Vice to submit to the second recording, and admitting this re-
cording as evidence, did not infringe upon Vice's privilege against
self-incrimination. The court thus apparently abandoned a long-
standing rule of evidence in South Carolina.
Many courts and writers have argued that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies only to "testimonial or commu-
nicative" evidence.56 This approach has been followed by the
United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California,7 up-
holding the forceful taking of a blood sample. More recently, in
United States v. Wade,5" the Court decided that a defendant may
be compelled to speak aloud in a line-up for the purpose of voice
identification by witnesses to the crime. Wade was relied upon by
the State in Vice and cited by the South Carolina court to support
its holding. 9
Prior to Vice, however, South Carolina had not specifically
adopted the "communicative" approach of Schmerber in this
area. The late Professor James Dreher summarized the state's
rule in his widely-used treatise on South Carolina evidence law:
"South Carolina . . .has drawn the line between active conduct
and passive. Under our decisions, a suspect may be required to
54. See, e.g., Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968). The question
should be viewed in terms of the purposes of Miranda. Resolution of the question should
thus be based on the duration of effectiveness of the first warning in each case.
55. 259 S.C. 30, 190 S.E.2d 510 (1972).
56. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 124 (2d ed. 1972).
57. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
58. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
59. 259 S.C. at 38, 190 S.E.2d at 513.
[Vol. 25
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allow his fingerprints to be taken, or his body examined, . . . but
he may not be required to use his voice for identification. " 60
State v. Taylor' was cited by the defendant in Vice for the
proposition that an accused may not be forced to use his voice for
identification.12 State v. Griffin 3 was cited as articulating the
"active-passive" test, and for illustrating the "utmost caution"
historically exercised by the South Carolina court when deciding
questions of self-incrimination. 4 In Griffin it was held that at
trial the police could remove the defendant's shoe and fit it into
an incriminating, molded footprint, but that the defendant could
not be required to do so himself.
Neither Taylor nor Griffin was distinguished or even men-
tioned by the State's brief in Vice. Neither case was discussed by
the court in its opinion. Thus, though neither case has been ex-
pressly overruled, the holding in Vice leads to the unmistakable
conclusion that they are no longer the law in South Carolina and
that the "communicative" test of the Schmerber decision has
been adopted.
One federal court case in South Carolina dealt with the prob-
lem of self-incrimination. In United States v. 20 "Dealers Choice"
Machines & Coin Contents of $3.50,65 the defendants were
charged with failure to register illegal gambling devices. The dis-
trict court held that the very act of registration would have been
an incriminating admission and that such self-incrimination can
not be required.
VI. LINEUPS
In State v. Williams66 the defendant was pointed out from the
witness stand by the victims of two crimes. On cross-examination
one witness admitted that the defendant had previously been
shown to her through a two-way mirror at police headquarters.
The other witness testified that he had identified the defendant
at a pre-trial lineup where no counsel was present.
60. J. DREHER, A GUIDE To EVIDENCE LAw IN SOUTH CAROLINA 32 (1967) (emphasis
added).
61. 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948).
62. Brief for Appellant at 20.
63. 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924).
64. Brief for Appellant at 28.
65. 341 F. Supp. 1147 (D.S.C. 1972).
66. 258 S.C. 482, 189 S.E.2d 299 (1972).
1973]
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In United States v. Wade"7 the United States Supreme Court
held that an accused is entitled to the presence of counsel at a
lineup. It was also held that a pre-trial identification, made in the
absence of counsel and affirmed on the witness stand, may render
the in-court identification inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." When such an identification is made, the government must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court iden-
tification is of independent origin and untainted by an unlawful
prior confrontation. This showing should be made before the trial
judge and out of the jury's presence. 8
In Williams no such showing or determination was made.
Upon objection by the defense attorney at trial, the judge merely
noted the objection and allowed the testimony to be given. The
supreme court, citing Wade, remanded the case to the trial court
for a hearing on the independence of the in-court identifications.
If the identifications were found to have been tainted by the pre-
trial confrontations, the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
In State v. Miller 9 the defendant was identified at a properly
conducted lineup by a witness to the crime. While testifying
about the lineup identification, the witness stated to the jury that
all the participants in the lineup had worn prison uniforms. The
defendant contended that such testimony improperly implied
that he had been convicted of another crime prior to the line-up.
This implication, he argued, created prejudice against him in the
minds of the jurors, thereby denying him the right to a trial by a
fair and impartial jury. The supreme court rejected this conten-
tion, reasoning that the logical inference from the witness' testi-
mony was merely that the defendant was being held for trial on
the crime charged.
VII. TRIAL
A. Venue
The defendants in United States v. Walden70 had committed
a series of robberies of federally insured banks in several states.
An indictment of numerous counts was returned against the de-
67. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Court in Wade based the right to counsel upon the right
to confrontation.
68. Id.
69. 258 S.C. 572, 190 S.E.2d 23 (1972).
70. 464 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1972).
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fendants, and a trial on all counts was held in the District of
South Carolina. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that venue for counts of the indictment charging robbery of banks
in states other than South Carolina was improperly laid in South
Carolina, and that the defendants were entitled to trials in the
states in which the various robberies took place.
B. Security
In State v. Smith7' the court considered the effect of extraor-
dinary security precautions in the courtroom. The trial judge had
received information that guns would be brought into court dur-
ing a specific trial and used against the court and the jurors. As
a precaution prospective jurors were told to assemble in a room
not normally used for that purpose. Three police officers were
stationed at the courtroom door, but only one was in uniform.
Persons entering the courtroom were searched outside the door,
unseen by the jurors. From seven to ten police officers were inside
the courtroom. Two, the number regularly in attendance, were in
uniform as usual. The rest wore plain clothes. The defendant
objected to these precautions and moved for a continuance, which
was denied. The supreme court confirmed the judge's decision,
holding that such precautions were reasonable under the circum-
stances, were taken in the most unobtrusive manner possible, and
in no sense deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
C. Continuance
Another basis for the continuance requested in Smith was
the failure of one of the defendant's alibi witnesses to appear at
the trial. The witness had been subpoenaed, and a bench warrant
was issued when she failed to appear. Because she could not be
located, the solicitor and counsel for the defendant prepared a
statement stipulating the witness' anticipated testimony, and
this statement was read to the jury. The defendant's motion for
a continuance until the witness could be found was denied by the
trial judge. The supreme court on appeal held that a motion for
a continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and
that in this instance no abuse of that discretion was shown. 2
71. 259 S.C. 309, 191 S.E.2d 638 (1972).
72. Id.
1973]
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In State v. Bennett73 the defendant made a motion for a
continuance at the start of the trial. Although he had retained an
attorney, he said that he wanted to hire William Kunstler to
defend him. On appeal from the denial of the motion for continu-
ance, the supreme court stated that the defendant's constitu-
tional right to counsel had been fully met by "diligent and tal-
ented" counsel, and that no grounds for a continuance existed
which would justify a reversal of the lower court's ruling.74
The defendant in State v. Muldrow75 was charged with mur-
der and armed robbery. He sought to establish an alibi by the
testimony of several witnesses that he had been placing a long-
distance telephone call at the time of the crime. To support this
alibi, he attempted to introduce records of the telephone com-
pany, but those records did not become available until Monday,
October 11, 1971. The trial concluded on Friday, October 8, 1971.
The defendant moved for a continuance until the evidence could
be obtained. The motion was denied, however, and the defendant
alleged error.70
The State contended that the motion had been addressed to
the trial judge's discretion. It was pointed out that the jury was
sequestered and that the evidence, if obtained, would not have
established either who placed the alleged telephone call or the
exact time of the call.7 The supreme court held that, in view of
the probable weight of the evidence and the potential inconveni-
ence to the jury, the denial of the continuance was not an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge.
In State v. Ham7 the court ruled that a long delay did not
deny the defendant's right to a speedy trial because the delay was
caused by the defendant's own requests for removals and continu-
ances.
D. Consolidation and Joinder
In State v. Crowe79 two defendants, Crowe and Wright, were
tried together for a single murder. The testimony indicated that
73. 259 S.C. 50, 190 S.E.2d 497 (1972).
74. Id. at 54, 190 S.E.2d at 498.
75. 259 S.C. 415, 192 S.E.2d 211 (1972).
76. Brief for Appellant at 3.
77. Brief for Respondent at 2.
78. 259 S.C. 118, 191 S.E.2d 13 (1972).
79. 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972).
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Crowe had shot the victim. Wright was charged with murder
under the felony-murder doctrine.8 When Wright refused to tes-
tify by asserting his privilege against self-incrimination, Crowe
unsuccessfully requested severance. The supreme court held that
the refusal to sever was not error. Before error will be found some
prejudice arising out of the joint trial must be shown. In the
court's view, Crowe failed to demonstrate that Wright would
have testified at a separate trial, or that such testimony, if forth-
coming, would have exonerated Crowe.
In State v. Taylor8 the supreme court rejected one defen-
dant's contention that a co-defendant's change of plea to guilty,
after the trial was underway, denied the defendant a trial before
a fair and impartial jury. The court found no facts indicating that
the jury was biased because of the change of plea.
E. Evidence
In State v. Wheeler 2 the State's case against the defendants
was built entirely on circumstantial evidence. The supreme court
in upholding the conviction set out the requirements for circum-
stantial proof: "Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon by
the state in a criminal case, there must be positive proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, warrant inferences of
guilt to a moral certainty, to the exclusion of any other reasonable
hypothesis." 3
Charged with voluntary manslaughter, the defendant in
State v. Washington4 asserted that he had killed the victim in
self-defense. He was convicted and appealed, contending that
there was no evidence contradicting his assertion and that a di-
rected verdict should have been granted. The supreme court in
affirming held that, even when testimony is uncontradicted, rea-
sonable men can disbelieve it and decide that another course of
events, known to be more natural from experience, is more proba-
ble. This possibility, when viewed in light of the burden upon the
defendant to establish self-defense, justified submission of the
case to the jury.
80. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
81. 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 (1972).
82. 193 S.E.2d 515 (S.C. 1972).
83. Id. at 519.
84. 193 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. 1972).
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In State v. Taylor85 the defendant voluntarily took the stand
at his trial. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked why the
defendant had made no exculpatory statement while under inter-
rogation after his arrest. On appeal, the supreme court stated
that the defendant had waived his privilege against self-
incrimination by taking the stand. Inquiry into the defendant's
failure to make a prior statement was therefore a legitimate at-
tack on his credibility which did not undermine the right to re-
main silent during police interrogation.86
F. Verdict
The indictment in Young v. State17 charged robbery and lar-
ceny. The defendant was found guilty of robbery, but no specific
verdict was returned on the charge of larceny. The defendant
appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent, be-
cause the absence of a verdict on the larceny charge amounted
to a verdict of not guilty. The court pointed out that robbery is
merely larceny with an additional element.88 Thus, because rob-
bery includes all the elements of larceny, the court reasoned that
the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty of larceny as a
condition precedent to finding him guilty of robbery. Failure to
announce this preliminary determination did not, in the court's
view, make the verdicts inconsistent.
A similar point was raised in State v. McFadden.8 9 The de-
fendant was charged with larceny and housebreaking. The evi-
85. 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 (1972).
86. The exact basis of this holding is somewhat obscure. Defendant's waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege at trial was not the point in dispute. The crucial question
presented by this case is whether a penalty can be placed at trial upon the exercise of a
constitutional privilege before trial. It cannot be disputed that Miranda firmly established
the right to remain silent during a pre-trial interrogation. This right is constitutionally
based. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), the Supreme Court expressly barred comment by the prosecutor on the defendant's
exercise of the fifth amendment privilege at trial. Such comment, it was held, amounts
to a penalty upon the exercise of the constitutional privilege. Although no case has arisen
upon the exact facts in Taylor, the analogy to Griffin is obvious. There seems to be no
reason to permit a penalty, by prosecutorial comment, upon the exercise of a constitu-
tional right to remain silent before trial, while the same penalty, through the same means,
is expressly forbidden when placed upon the exercise of the privilege during trial.
87. 259 S.C. 383, 192 S.E.2d 212 (1972).
88. "Robbery is larceny from the person by violence or intimidation. It is both an
offense against the person and an offense against property." R. PERKINS, CRMnHx. LAw
190 (2d ed. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
89. 193 S.E.2d 536 (S.C. 1972).
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dence indicated that he drove the "getaway car" while some ac-
complices did the actual "dirty work." There was a dispute as to
the defendant's knowledge of his accomplices' precise intentions
when he let them out of the car. Because of the ambivalence of
the evidence on this point, it was held that the jury could reason-
ably conclude that the defendant knew his friends intended to
commit larceny but did not know that they intended to break
into a house to do it. A verdict of guilty of larceny was therefore
not inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty of housebreaking.
G. Sentence
In State v. Crowell the supreme court rejected the contention
that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. Two
subsequent cases, s' however, were returned to the lower courts for
resentencing to comply with Furman v. Georgia,92 in which the
United States Supreme Court held the death penalty unconstitu-
tional.
9 3
VIII. APPEAL
Several cases arose during 1972 in'which objections were held
to have been waived. In State v. Taylor94 the prosecution had
questioned the defendant about some prior parole violations. The
court held that, even when this line of questioning is improper,
the error is waived by the defendant's failure to object at trial.
In State v. Jordan95 the court refused to consider grounds for
90. 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972). See also note 18 supra and accompanying
text.
91. State v. Bellue, 193 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1972); State v. Gibson, 259 S.C. 459, 192
S.E.2d 720 (1972). In Bellue the supreme court also indicated that the doctrine of in
favorem vitae is no longer available. The court has historically applied the doctrine in
cases where the appellant had been sentenced to death. In such cases questions not
properly before the court due to waiver, etc., would be considered. The Furman case,
however, has made the doctrine inapplicable.
92. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
93. Furman did not rule the death penalty unconstitutional per se. Some states are
presently formulating new death penalty statutes designed to meet the Supreme Court's
objections as expressed in Furman. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04, 794.01 (1972); State
v. Waddell, 194 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. 1973), construing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, -21, -52, -
58 (1969) (death penalty made mandatory by striking provisions for jury recommendations
of life sentences). See generally McDonald, Capital Punishment in South Carolina: The
End of an Era, 24 S.C.L. REv. 762 (1972).
94. 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 (1972).
95. 258 S.C. 240, 188 S.E.2d 780 (1972).
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an objection which had not been relied on at the trial. In the same
case cross-examination of a witness on a point to which an objec-
tion had previously been made, without reservation of the objec-
tion, was held to be a waiver of the objection.
The sword cuts both ways, however, as was demonstrated by
State v. Hall96 in which it was held that an objection is waived if
not reserved before redirect examination on the point challenged.
In Sellers v. State17 disciplinary proceedings resulted in loss
by some inmates at the state penitentiary of good conduct bene-
fits and segregation of those inmates in maximum security cells.
Relying on a California federal court case, Cluchette v.
Procunier,5 the inmates contended that the disciplinary proceed-
ings could result in a "grievous loss," and were therefore subject
to due process requirements. The supreme court apparently re-
jected this argument, reasoning that the actions of the prison
officials had been made in good faith and in pursuance of order
and discipline within the prison. Such actions, it was held, are
not subject to judicial review. The underlying question in Sellers,
however, was not decided by the court. That question is, at what
stage do disciplinary proceedings conducted by state prison offi-
cials become subject to due process requirements. Sellers did not
meet the question squarely, and the United States Supreme
Court has not ruled on the point.
SAUNDERS M. BRIDGES, JR.
96. 193 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 1972). But see Green v. Shaw, 136 S.C. 56, 134 S.E. 226
(1926), noted in 24 S.C.L. REv. 559, 561 (1972) and Survey of Evidence infra.
97. 193 S.E.2d 513 (S.C. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 967 (1973). Sellers is currently
seeking habeas corpus in federal district court.
98. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The "grievous loss" test is adapted from
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969), and must be judged according to the potential
rather than the actual loss. Goldberg involved the necessity of a hearing before termina-
tion of welfare payments.
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